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Highlights 
 
 This paper analyses the effects of retirement on mental health in Europe. 
 Regular state pension ages are used for identification purposes. 
 We find no short-term effects, but a large negative longer-term impact. 
 There is no evidence of heterogeneous effects across different groups. 
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Retirement Blues* 
 
Gabriel Heller-Sahlgren†,‡,§ 
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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the short- and longer-term effects of retirement on mental 
health in ten European countries. It exploits thresholds created by state pension 
ages in an individual-fixed effects instrumental-variable set-up, borrowing 
intuitions from the regression-discontinuity design literature, to deal with 
endogeneity in retirement behaviour. The results display no short-term effects of 
retirement on mental health, but a large negative longer-term impact. This 
impact survives a battery of robustness tests, and applies to women and men as 
well as people of different educational and occupational backgrounds similarly. 
Differences compared with previous research are attributed to the study’s 
differentiation of short- and longer-term effects as well as its research design. 
Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that reforms inducing people to postpone 
retirement are not only important for making pension systems solvent, but with 
time could also pay a mental health dividend among the elderly and reduce 
public health care costs. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
In the post-World War II period, the combination of increasing life expectancy, 
decreasing fertility rates, and the normalisation of old-age retirement has 
induced lower overall labour force participation rates in developed countries. 
The rise of retirement was in turn in large part due to incentives built into public 
pension systems, which have induced people to exit the labour market 
voluntarily (e.g. Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004; Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder 
2012). Decreasing labour force participation rates have put pressure on the 
sustainability of pension systems, while depressing savings rates and investment 
levels. Politicians have begun to reform state pension systems to incentivise the 
elderly to postpone retirement, for example by increasing the official retirement 
age at which state pension benefits may be drawn. 
     However, these policies may have unintended consequences, which must be 
taken into account to understand the reforms’ total utility. One such issue 
concerns how retirement affects mental health. In the past decades, public policy 
has become more concerned with improving people’s wellbeing in general. Thus, 
if retirement has a positive impact on mental health, attempts to increase the 
effective retirement age may thwart this policy goal, while possibly also leading 
to higher sick-leave rates and rising health expenditures. On the other hand, if 
retirement has negative effects on mental health, policymakers who seek to 
incentivise people to postpone retirement could, if they are successful, produce a 
virtuous circle in which public pensions systems are made sustainable, health 
expenditures decreased, and mental health among the population improved. 
     Previous research analysing health effects of retirement yields mixed results, 
possibly reflecting both methodological choices and a general failure to 
distinguish between short- and longer-term effects. This study investigates the 
impact of retirement on mental health in Europe in both a short- and longer-
term perspective. Utilising several waves of panel data from the Survey of Health, 
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe from ten European countries, it exploits 
thresholds created by state pension ages in an individual-fixed effects 
instrumental-variable (FE-IV) set-up, borrowing intuitions from the regression-
discontinuity design (RDD) literature, to deal with endogeneity in retirement 
behaviour. The idea is that these thresholds create strong economic incentives to 
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 2 
retire once crossed, but should not affect mental health in other ways once age 
effects are held constant in a flexible way. Previous research has utilised similar 
strategies – most often finding positive or zero short-term effects of retirement 
on mental health – but tends to ignore common pitfalls that threaten their 
validity and the possibility that the effects of retirement is not instant. To the 
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyse both short- and longer-
term, lagged effects of retirement on mental health in a set-up exploiting age-
dependent discontinuities to predict retirement. 
     The results display no short-term impact of retirement on mental health, but 
strong negative effects that become apparent a couple of years following the 
event. The longer-term effect does not differ between men and women, or 
between people with different educational and occupational backgrounds. It also 
survives a battery of robustness tests, which include analyses of narrower age 
windows and using inverse probability weighting to deal with panel attrition. 
The differences compared with similar research are attributed to the fact that 
this study differentiates between short- and long-term effects as well as uses a 
methodology that provides a cleaner estimate of the impact of retirement per se. 
     Overall, the findings indicate that politicians do not face a trade-off between 
increasing state pension ages and improving wellbeing. Inducing people to 
postpone retirement is not only necessary to make pension systems sustainable, 
but can also be a way to improve mental health among the elderly. While pension 
reforms may have immediate negative mental health effects prior to retirement 
as some research suggests – at least if these reforms postpone eligibility rules 
late in people’s lives – this paper indicates that they may pay a mental health 
dividend after some time by delaying the negative longer-term impact of 
retirement per se. 
     The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical mechanisms 
potentially linking retirement to mental health; Section 3 discusses the previous 
literature; Section 4 discusses the data utilised; Section 5 outlines the paper’s 
research strategy; Section 6 presents the results; and Section 7 concludes. 
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 3 
2 Theory 
 
Why and how might retirement affect mental health? One way to think about the 
relationship between the two variables is through an economic lens in which 
individuals seek to maximise their utility. In Grossman’s (2000) human capital 
model, health acts both as a direct consumption good, since it is important for 
people’s wellbeing, and as an investment, since individuals must be in good 
health to be able to work and increase their lifetime earnings. Retirement may 
affect these properties differently: the incentive to be in good health for 
investment purposes is no longer present in retirement, but since individuals 
have more free time as retirees, the consumption value of health may increase. In 
the end, the theoretical net effect then depends on whether the overall marginal 
utility of health decreases or increases after retirement – which is far from 
straightforward to predict (Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic 2006). 
     A similarly ambiguous story concerns other explanations that do not 
necessarily rely on rational choice. For example, retirement may affect 
individuals’ stocks of social capital and networks, which research suggests have 
positive effects on health (e.g. d’Hombres et al. 2010; Folland 2008; Rocco, 
Fumagalli, and Suhrcke 2014; Ronconi, Brown, and Scheffler 2012). Yet it is 
theoretically unclear how retirement affects social interactions: people may lose 
work colleagues, but they also have more time to establish a new, voluntarily 
established, social network. Perhaps reflecting this theoretical ambiguity, 
research finds mixed effects of retirement on the size of individuals’ social 
networks (Börsch-Supan and Schuth 2014; Fletcher 2014). While retirement 
could potentially increase time spent with spouses, it could also decrease it if it 
raises the probability of divorce (see Stancanelli 2012). A similarly equivocal 
story applies to stress. While retirement may decrease work-related stress, it is 
in itself a life event that may be very stressful. And retirement is often 
accompanied by a decrease in income and consumption (e.g. Finnie and Spencer 
2013), which may affect mental health negatively directly and via increased 
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 4 
stress. In fact, such ambiguous stories apply to most theoretical mechanisms 
potentially linking retirement to mental health.1 
     Furthermore, it is important to note that retirement may have different effects 
in the short- and longer-term perspective. This is partly because the effect of 
investments in health is likely to operate with a lag, which means that the impact 
of lower/higher investments does not necessarily bring negative/positive effects 
until after some time. Similarly, in the beginning, retirement may be perceived 
more like a holiday rather than as permanent labour market exit (e.g. Atchley 
1976). If so, one may also expect people’s mental health to improve – or at least 
not deteriorate – during this period. In a longer-term perspective, however, the 
holiday effect may fade out and be replaced by mechanisms generating lower 
mental health. Alternatively, it may be the case that retirement increases stress 
and dissatisfaction in the short run, which then subsides in the long run as 
people acclimatise. All this is related more generally to the ‘hedonic treadmill’ 
hypothesis (Brickman and Campbell 1971), which stipulates that life events only 
affect wellbeing in the short term as individuals adapt with time. Thus, it is 
clearly important to take into account that short- and longer-term effects of 
retirement may differ, although it is difficult to predict how and in what ways. 
 
3 Previous literature 
 
The impact of retirement on health has become a topic of increasing interest 
among researchers in economics and other fields. Correlational studies analysing 
the association between retirement and mental health find mixed effects (e.g. 
Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic 2008; Jokela et al. 2010; Lindeboom, Portrait, and 
van den Berg 2002; Mein et al. 2003; Mosca and Barrett 2014; Oksanen et al. 
2011; Vo et al. 2015; Westerlund et al. 2009). However, the key problem for 
these studies is that retirement is not random, which means that they cannot 
tease out its causal effects on mental health. 
     Improving the methodology, some researchers have utilised IV models using 
eligibility ages at which state pension benefits can be drawn to predict 
retirement. The idea is that reaching these eligibility ages gives rise to significant 
                                                        
1 Of course, there is a plethora of other theoretical mechanisms through which retirement could 
potentially affect mental health in different ways, such as changes in health insurance status, 
although these are also often related to the rational choice perspective. 
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 5 
economic incentives to retire. At the same time, the argument goes, there is no 
reason why reaching the threshold per se should affect mental health apart from 
via retirement, once smooth effects of age are held constant. This gives rise to the 
potential to use these thresholds as instruments for retirement in IV or fuzzy 
RDD frameworks. Another approach has been to utilise pension reforms in 
difference-in-difference set-ups, comparing individuals affected by the reforms 
with individuals who are not. Overall, studies using either of these research 
strategies tend to find no or positive effects of retirement on mental health (e.g. 
Behncke 2012; Blake and Garrouste 2012; Charles 2004; Coe and Zamarro 2011; 
Eibich 2015; Fé and Hollingsworth 2012; Fonseca et al. 2014; Johnston and Lee 
2009; Latif 2013; Mazzonna and Peracchi 2014; Neuman 2008).2 
     However, this research also suffers from some limitations. First, it tends to 
include a number of ‘bad controls’ that are endogenous to retirement, which 
means that it controls for some of the causal pathways through which retirement 
may affect mental health (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Such bad controls include 
consumption, marital status, and income – all of which may both affect mental 
health and be affected by retirement (e.g. Finnie and Spencer 2013; Haider and 
Stephens 2007; Stancanelli 2014). Second, most studies ignore potential 
differences between immediate and lagged effects of retirement, which, as noted 
in Section 2, may be quite different. Third, studies evaluating pension reforms in 
difference-in-difference set-ups ignore that such reforms often impact on 
behaviour, and mental health, before individuals retire (e.g. Bertoni, Brunello, 
and Mazzarella 2016; de Grip, Lindeboom, and Montizaan 2012; Montizaan, 
Cörvers, and de Grip 2010). This violates the assumption that the reforms used 
for identification affect mental health solely through retirement, thereby casting 
doubt on the studies’ internal validity. 
     Another potential problem in most previous research is that it uses 
instruments constructed from both regular and early retirement ages. This 
                                                        
2 Using a regular IV set-up, Mazzonna and Peracchi (2014) also find weak evidence in robustness 
tests that longer time spent in retirement increases the likelihood of depression on average. 
However, the instrument used is the distance of respondents’ actual age from the relevant 
pension thresholds. As discussed in Section 5.1, this variable should normally be included as a 
control to allow the age trend to differ on both sides of the threshold and thus decrease the risk 
that the binary retirement indicator, which in their study is only used to estimate the immediate 
impact of retirement, picks up non-linear effects of age. This is not a trivial concern, especially 
since the authors use a relatively broad age window and control for a linear age trend only. 
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 6 
ignores the potential for self-selection into jobs where individuals are more 
likely to be able to retire early, which could undermine the validity of the 
findings. Furthermore, since early retirement ages often differ depending on 
vocation in European countries, it is difficult to find out which threshold that 
applies to which segment of the population. While discontinuities arising at the 
state pension age should help ameliorate measurement error in retirement 
status as observed in survey data – since the discontinuities are shaped by 
institutional rules and are therefore uncorrelated with potential measurement 
error – it is thus also possible that discontinuities at (alleged) early retirement 
ages induce new measurement error. This, in turn, is likely to produce 
attenuation bias in the estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Of course, it is also 
not clear whether early and regular retirement events have the same effects; as 
countries are in the process of increasing regular state pension ages specifically, 
disentangling the separate impact of retirement at these ages is important. 
     Another general problem with previous IV studies based on RDD intuitions is 
that they often ignore common pitfalls associated with such designs. For 
example, they do not present results in which the impact of age is allowed to 
differ on each side of the discontinuities used as instruments (Lee and Lemieux 
2010). Similarly, most existing studies do not analyse the sensitivity of the 
findings by narrowing the range of data analysed around the discontinuities 
(Angrist and Pischke 2015).3 Instead, they choose a rather wide range of data, 
without sufficiently exploring non-linear effects of age or the results’ sensitivity 
to the specific data range.4 
     Overall, therefore, while previous research most often finds no or positive 
effects of retirement on mental health, it suffers from some limitations. Perhaps 
most important is that previous studies do not generally separate short- from 
longer-term effects of retirement. This study aims to remedy the shortcomings 
highlighted and provide a more rigorous evaluation of the impact of retirement 
on mental health in Europe. Section 5 discusses this strategy in detail. 
                                                        
3 Most previous multi-country research has also ignored the possibility that the impact of age on 
mental health differs across countries. If such differential age effects are correlated with the state 
pension ages utilised in the analysis, estimates may be biased. 
4 The exception is Eibich’s (2015) paper, which finds a short-term positive impact of retirement 
on mental health in Germany. 
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 7 
4 Data 
 
This study utilises data from the first, second, and fourth waves of the Survey of 
Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), conducted at different points 
in 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2011-12 respectively. In these waves, SHARE provides 
information on a wide range of background and outcome variables from 
representative samples of individuals who are aged 50 and over in ten European 
countries (see Börsch-Supan et al. 2013): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.5 Analysing 
panel data spanning over several SHARE waves allows us to investigate both the 
short- and longer-term effects of retirement on mental health. Table 1 displays 
the timeline for interviews over the period analysed. 
 
Table 1: Timeline for interviews   
  Mean Min Max 
Wave 1 October 2004 March 2004 December 2005 
Wave 2 January 2007 September 2006 October 2007 
Wave 4 May 2011 February 2011 March 2012 
Time passed 
 (Waves 1-2) 
2 years, 3 months 11 months 3 years, 4 months 
Time passed 
(Waves 2-4) 
4 years, 4 months 3 years, 5 months 5 years, 6 months 
Time passed  
(Waves 1-4) 
6 years, 7 months 5 years, 6 months 7 years, 10 months 
Note: the timeline refers to the main sample within the ten-year age window over and below the 
relevant state pension age. It is essentially identical for the sample within the three-year age 
window. 
 
     As Table 1 shows, the second interview is held on average two years and three 
months after the first interview, whereas the fourth interview is held on average 
four years and four months after the second interview, and six years and seven 
months after the first interview.6 In our main analysis, we study the impact of a 
change in retirement status over the first and second waves on the change in 
mental health over the second and the fourth waves. Since the fourth interview 
takes place several years after the change in retirement status took place 
                                                        
5 The SHARE dataset has been used widely in related economic research (e.g. Coe and Zamarro 
2011; Godard 2016; Mazzonna and Peracchi 2012; Rohwedder and Willis 2010).  
6 In unreported robustness tests, we restricted the sample to (1) only individuals with a time 
span between the first and second waves of minimum two years and maximum three years, and 
(2) only individuals with a time span between the second and third waves of minimum four and 
maximum five years. Overall, the main results were very similar. 
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 8 
between the first and the second waves, we believe our set-up captures a lagged, 
longer-term effect well. We also seek to compare and contrast this impact with 
the effect of a change in retirement status between the first and second waves on 
changes in mental health over the same period, which captures the immediate, 
short-term impact. The methodology utilised to tease out the different effects is 
discussed in detail in Section 5. 
4.1 Sample 
 
The main sample includes individuals who were interviewed in the first, second, 
and fourth wave of SHARE and who were 50–75 years old at the second wave 
interview.7 As discussed in Section 5, the study exploits discontinuities in 
retirement that occur at the state pension age to obtain exogenous variation in 
retirement behaviour. The state pension ages for the ten European countries 
utilised in the study – which take into account pension reforms in recent decades 
and thus vary across cohorts within countries – are displayed in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. The threshold varies between 55 and 67 years, depending on country, 
gender, and cohort. However, individuals reaching their state pension age 
between the first and the second SHARE waves – which is the relevant threshold 
for the set-up outlined in Section 5 – were between 60 and 65.8 This gives an age 
window of about ten years over and under the lowest and highest thresholds 
utilised, calculated at the second wave, which is in line with Moreau and 
Stancanelli (2013) and Stancanelli and Van Soest (2012). 
     The working sample thus consists of maximum 8,566 individuals across the 
ten countries, all observed three times, with the exact sample size depending on 
the restrictions discussed in Section 4.2. Table 2 provides summary statistics for 
the working sample as well as differences in means between individuals assigned 
to the treatment group (those who crossed the state pension age between the 
first and second interviews), and individuals assigned to the control group (those 
                                                        
7 Since the third wave was a special survey (SHARELIFE) that did not enquire respondents about 
their mental health, it cannot be used in this paper. 
8 The only exception is in Denmark, where individuals born before July 1939 instead faced a 
retirement age of 67. To ensure that individuals of the same age are analysed in all countries, the 
right-hand side of the age window is calculated from age 65 also for the Danish sample. However, 
all results are essentially identical if the Danish age window is instead extended by two years on 
the right-hand side, which only increases the sample by about 30 respondents. Results are also 
robust to extending the right-hand side of the age window to 67 for all countries. 
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 9 
who did not cross the state pension age between the first and second 
interviews).9 In robustness tests, we also utilise a narrower age window of three 
years around the lowest and highest state pension ages, which means that people 
who were 57-68 years old at the second wave are included. This decreases the 
sample size to maximum 4,704 individuals, again all observed three times. 
 
4.2 Retirement 
 
The study employs three different definitions of retirement. First, it classifies 
individuals as retired if they claim to be retired or give a date at which they 
retired that precedes the interview date. Given the methodology outlined in 
Section 5, this means that we analyse the impact of retirement compared to the 
status of employed/self-employed, homemaker, unemployed, being engaged in 
other activities, as well as the permanently ill or disabled. This definition is 
useful since all non-retirees, not only those who are engaged in paid work, may 
respond to retirement incentives at the state pension age. This is because they 
may still be able to access age-dependent benefits at that point, which could 
trigger permanent withdrawal from the labour market and make them regard 
themselves to be retired.10 Furthermore, for policy purposes, the mental health 
impact of retirement is relevant regardless from which category respondents 
officially retire. 
     However, to ensure that the above definition of retirement does not drive the 
results, we also employ an alternative definition based on retirement from the 
labour force only. In this definition, which is similar to Coe and Zamarro’s 
(2011), homemakers, respondents who report being permanently ill or disabled, 
and those who are engaged in other activities are instead included in the 
retirement category, as long as they do not also report having done any paid 
                                                        
9 The FE-IV design described in Section 5 analyses compliers only: respondents assigned to the 
treatment group who actually retired between waves 1 and 2 and respondents assigned to the 
control group who did not retire in that period. In robustness tests, we simultaneously analyse 
the lagged impact of retiring between waves 1 and 2 and the direct effect of retiring between 
waves 2 and 4, both in the full sample and when excluding individuals who were retired and 
above the state pension age at the first interview. Effectively, the control group is then restricted 
to (1) non-retired respondents and (2) non-retired respondents under the state pension age. As 
Table A5 shows, the results are very similar in these analyses, indicating that our main control 
group is appropriate for capturing the causal longer-term impact of retirement on mental health. 
10 This argument is supported by the fact that the F statistic for the instrument utilised is indeed 
the strongest when utilising this definition, indicating that respondents who are not engaged in 
paid work prior to retirement do respond to the incentives in the regular state pension system. 
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work in the past four weeks. Respondents in these categories who report having 
done paid work are still included as non-retirees. Finally, in the third definition, 
the sample is simply restricted to individuals who claim to be retired or to be 
working. The latter category includes employed/self-employed respondents and 
others who report having done paid work in the past four weeks. 
 
4.3 Mental health 
 
Following previous research in the field, our primary measure of mental health is 
the Euro-D scale. The scale was developed specifically as a common depression 
gauge in the European Union and has shown to be valid for research purposes 
(see Prince et al. 1999). The scale ranges from 0 to 12, with higher values 
indicating stronger depressive tendencies, counting whether or not respondents 
reported having had problems with the following in the past month: appetite, 
concentration, depression, enjoyment, fatigue, guilt, interest, irritability, 
pessimism, sleep, suicidality, and tearfulness. Furthermore, we also analyse the 
likelihood that respondents are above the conventional threshold for clinical 
depression, which is defined as a score of 4 or more on the Euro-D scale. In both 
cases, therefore, higher values indicate worse mental health. 
 
4.4 Control variables 
 
If the design discussed in Section 5 produces random variation in respondents’ 
retirement behaviour, the only necessary covariates to ensure a causal 
interpretation of the estimates are flexible controls for respondents’ age. 
However, to test robustness of the estimates, it is also useful to include lagged 
mental health status to ensure that mean reversion does not bias the findings. 
Doing so may also increase precision in the estimates. It is also possible to 
interact certain background variables with the retirement indicator in order to 
investigate potential heterogeneous effects. These issues are discussed more 
formally in Section 5.1. 
 
4.5 Attrition 
 
It is important to consider potential selection problems due to non-random 
panel attrition, which is often ignored by studies exploiting panel surveys to 
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evaluate various outcomes of retirement (e.g. Bonsang, Adam, and Perelman 
2012; Eibich 2015). Like in most panel surveys, attrition in SHARE is substantial: 
about 50 per cent of people interviewed in the first SHARE wave disappear by 
the fourth wave. Of course, this has no bearing on the results if attrition is 
unrelated to how retirement affects mental health, but this cannot be established 
a priori. However, it is possible to include individual-fixed effects, which control 
for time-invariant variables that affect both respondents’ propensity to remain in 
the panel as well as their retirement behaviour and mental health. This should at 
least mitigate the attrition problem. 
     As a further robustness check, the study also exploits inverse probability 
weighting, which allows attrition to be non-random as long as its causes are 
captured by individuals’ observable characteristics at the time before they drop 
out of the panel (Moffit, Fitzgerald, and Gottschalk 1999). This means that we 
estimate the probability that individuals who were interviewed in the first wave 
remain in the fourth wave, from variables observed in the final wave in which 
they participated prior to the fourth wave. These variables include age, 
employment status, marital status, education level, and a battery of self-assessed, 
mental, and physical health variables as well as indicators for cognitive 
achievement.11 In addition, country-fixed effects are included to ensure that 
differential attrition across countries does not bias the findings. 
     The inverse of the probability of remaining in the panel, as predicted by this 
model, is then used as weight in robustness regressions analysing the impact of 
retirement on mental health.12 If attrition poses a serious problem for the study, 
one would expect the results from the weighted models to differ significantly 
compared with the ones that exclude weights. If the results are very similar, on 
the other hand, it is unlikely that attrition poses a serious problem. Although it is 
impossible to demonstrate conclusively an absence of attrition bias, the 
combination of individual-level fixed effects and inverse probability weighting 
leave little room for any remaining bias. 
                                                        
11 The health and cognitive indicators include: self-assessed health, the Euro-D scale, the number 
of drugs taken, the number of diagnosed conditions, the number of limitations with activities of 
daily living, the number of mobility limitations, as well as memory and numeracy scores. 
12 The regression predicting the probability to remain in the panel is estimated using a probit 
model, but all weighted results are essentially identical if using a linear probability model 
instead. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Working sample  Treatment group Control group 
Wave 1 Mean SD Min Max Mean  Mean 
Age 60.63 6.65 47.23 74.46 62.53 60.42 
Retired (1) 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.43 
Retired (2) 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.70 0.57 
Retired (3) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.64 0.51 
Euro-D 2.16 2.10 0 12 1.98 2.19 
Depression 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.20 0.23 
Wave 2 Mean SD Min Max Mean  Mean 
Age 62.95 6.65 50 75.92 64.95 62.73 
Retired (1) 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.81 0.48 
Retired (2) 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.91 0.62 
Retired (3) 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.90 0.57 
Euro-D 2.09 2.06 0 11 1.91 2.11 
Depression 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.19 0.21 
Wave 4 Mean SD Min Max Mean Mean 
Age 67.24 6.66 54.08 80.77 69.20 67.02 
Retired (1) 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.87 0.62 
Retired (2) 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.96 0.75 
Retired (3) 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.96 0.72 
Euro-D 2.27 2.11 0 12 2.25 2.27 
Depression 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.25 0.24 
n 8,566 849 7,717 
Note: Respondents assigned to the treatment group crossed the state pension age between waves 
1 and 2, while respondents assigned to the control group did not cross the state pension age in 
that period. Retired (1): respondents who report to be retired or give a retirement date preceding 
the interview date. Retired (2): retired (1) plus homemakers, the permanently ill or disabled, and 
those engaged in other activities (as long as they do not do paid work). Retired (3): retired (1) but 
excluding all non-workers in the non-retired category (for the last definition: n = 7,113 in the total 
sample, n = 692 assigned to the treatment group and n = 6,421 assigned to the control group). 
 
5 Research design 
 
As noted in Section 3, any valid research design used to evaluate the causal effect 
of retirement on mental health must take into account that the former is likely 
endogenous to the latter. This section discusses the research design employed in 
the study to deal with endogeneity in retirement behaviour. 
5.1 Obtaining exogenous variation in retirement behaviour  
 
When analysing the impact of retirement on mental health, the easiest strategy is 
to estimate: 
                                               (1) 
where    is the mental health outcome analysed;    is a dummy variable taking 
either the value   (retired) or   (not retired); and    is a vector of control 
variables assumed to affect both retirement and mental health. 
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     The critical assumption is that                . But if    does not include all 
factors that affect both    and   , or if    has an independent impact on   , the 
results will be plagued by endogeneity. In addition, measurement error in    may 
generate attenuation bias. Any of these issues would mean that                 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). As noted in Section 3, the critical assumption is not 
likely to hold. To ensure a causal interpretation of the paper’s findings, it is thus 
key to obtain exogenous variation in retirement behaviour. 
     To do so, the paper proposes an individual-fixed effects IV design, with 
intuitions borrowed from the RDD literature. The design is based on retirement 
ages in European pension systems, which create age thresholds at which 
economic incentives to retire increase substantially. In this set-up, the 
discontinuities act as instruments for individuals’ employment status in a 2SLS 
model, with age as the continuous variable determining the discontinuities 
(Angrist and Piscke 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). As noted in Section 3, 
this idea has been exploited in previous research, but not in a way that allows 
researchers to distinguish between short- and longer-term effects. Because of the 
potential problems that may arise by using the early retirement age, as discussed 
in Section 3, the paper focuses solely on the regular state pension age. 
     The idea behind the design is formalised as follows: 
              
                     
                     
 , where                   
where     is the applicable eligibility age. For this paper’s purposes, the 
assumption is that                 , since economic incentives raise the 
likelihood that individuals retire when they reach the eligibility age. Thus, the 
probability of      as a function of      can be written: 
                                               
where      is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if          and 0 if 
        . The strategy is dependent on the ability to separate smooth effects of 
     from the impact at     , which serves as the instrument. The paper follows 
previous literature and assumes a quadratic age trend in the baseline estimates. 
Recent research shows that estimates including higher-order polynomials in 
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similar designs may be misleading and that it is therefore preferable to reduce 
the range of data around the threshold (Gelman and Imbens 2014). 
     The principal difference between our set-up and a regular fuzzy RDD is the 
inclusion of individual-level fixed effects, which means that we focus on the 
variation within individuals across time rather than the variation between 
individuals. This also means that the identification assumptions are different. 
While a traditional fuzzy RDD would hinge on the assumption that people who 
are on different sides of, but close to, the state pension age only differ in terms of 
the probability of being retired, once controlling flexibly for the direct impact of 
age, our individual fixed-effects IV estimator hinges on the assumption that 
merely crossing the threshold serving as instrument does not impact an 
individual’s mental health around the threshold apart from via retirement. We 
note that similar designs, combining individual-fixed effects with intuitions from 
the RDD literature, have been utilised in previous research in this and other 
fields (e.g. Eibich 2015; Lemeiux and Milligan 2008; Petterson-Lidbom 2012). 
     We thus model the lagged, longer-term impact of retirement on mental health 
using a 2SLS model. Unlike most previous research, we allow the impact of age to 
differ on both sides of the eligibility threshold used as instrument. To do so, we 
centre age and its polynomial with the discontinuity – by subtracting the state 
pension age from the respondent’s age – which ensures that the coefficient of the 
retirement indicator still measures the jump in the dependent variable at the 
threshold serving as instrument (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, 2015). We also 
take into account cross-country differences in age effects, below and above the 
threshold.13 The estimation then reads: 
                                       
                      
                  
                          
                         
                   
                                                (2)                                                  
                                                        
13 Thus, a key difference between this paper’s set-up and the one used by Coe and Zamarro 
(2011) is the fact that we exploit the longitudinal aspect of SHARE, allowing us to include 
individual-fixed effects and to separate short- from longer-term effects of retirement. Other 
differences include the fact that they analyse only men, do not take into account that the effect of 
age may differ across countries, ignore the fact that the impact of age may differ below and above 
the threshold serving as instrument, use both early and regular state pension ages as 
instruments, and control for potentially endogenous variables, such as marital status and income. 
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                                                 (3) 
where       is the predicted values of       from the first stage with         as the 
excluded instrument;         and        
 denote                   and 
                 
  respectively;    denotes individual-fixed effects; and    and 
   represent separate year- and month-fixed effects respectively. Including 
interactions between the age variables and   , which denote country dummies, 
means that the effect of age is allowed to differ across countries.14 
     The model thus effectively analyses the impact of a change in retirement 
status between the first and second waves (on average spanning two years and 
three months) on the change in mental health between the second and fourth 
waves (on average spanning four years and four months). Because the shift in 
retirement status may occur at any point between the two interviews, but mental 
health is measured at the exact point of the interviews, the model focuses only on 
the change in mental health that occurs after the shift in retirement status has 
taken place. However, the set-up also risks ignoring potential immediate effects 
of a shift in retirement status between the first and the second waves. Yet if we 
also control for lagged mental health, any difference between compliers in the 
treatment and control groups due to differential mental health trends between 
the first and the second waves is ignored. Also, in robustness tests, we simply 
analyse the change in mental health between the first and fourth waves, thus 
taking into account any short-term impact directly. 
    An important rationale behind the study is also to investigate whether the 
short-term effect of retirement differ from the longer-term impact. Thus, in 
models analysing the short-term effect of retirement, we estimate equations (2) 
and (3) but with all variables measured at   instead of    .15 Effectively, we 
then analyse the impact of retiring between the first and the second waves on the 
                                                        
14 The results are very similar if separate indicators for       and      
  and their interactions 
with   , are also included when analysing longer-term effects. This is expected if the strategy 
induces random variation in retirement behaviour. 
15 In estimations analysing short-term effects, the sample is restricted to observations in the first 
and the second waves. This ensures that the short- and longer-term effects are compared among 
the same individuals. However, results for the direct association and impact over the second and 
fourth waves are presented in Tables A2, A3, and A5 in the Appendix. 
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change in mental health over the same period. In this way, by altering the 
observation window across two and four waves respectively, it is possible to 
compare and contrast the short- and longer-term effects of retirement on mental 
health using the same spike in retirement that occurs at the state pension age as 
instrument, while at the same time holding constant differential linear and non-
linear age trends under and above the thresholds.16 
     We also investigate potential heterogeneous effects depending on gender, 
education level, as well as physical and psychological occupational burden. We 
create one dummy that takes the value 1 for women and 0 for men, and one 
dummy that takes the value 1 for education levels equal to or below lower-
secondary school and 0 otherwise. We then utilise Kroll’s (2011) indexes 
measuring the physical burden (OPB) and psychosocial burden (OSB) of different 
occupations by their ISCO-88 codes, which we link to the SHARE dataset.17 The 
indexes range from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating higher occupational 
strain. We create two dummies indicating physical and occupational strain above 
the value of 5. By interacting these variables with the retirement indicator, and in 
turn instrumenting the product with the interaction between the variables and 
the state pension threshold, it is possible to analyse such potential 
heterogeneous effects within the above framework. 
5.2 Assumptions 
 
A useful instrument must first of all be relevant, which in this case means that it 
should correlate with retirement. It must also be valid, in this case meaning that 
it must be exogenous to mental health, and further satisfy the monotonicity 
requirement, which here means that there cannot be people who are induced not 
to retire because they reach the state pension age (Imbens and Angrist 1994; 
                                                        
16 Our modelling approach thus differs from Mazzonna and Perrachi’s (2014) attempt to separate 
shorter- and longer-term effects of (early and regular) retirement on general health. Whereas 
these authors effectively use the interaction between      and               as instrument for 
time spent in retirement, we include the lagged version of this variable, its polynomial, and their 
interactions with country dummies as controls to ensure that differential age trends above the 
thresholds are held constant. Their approach risks confusing non-linear age effects above the 
state pension age with the impact of retirement. 
17 We use the ISCO-88 code for respondents’ last job in the first instance. For some respondents, 
the code is only available for their second or first job. To maximise the number of observations, 
we thus use the code for the second job in the second instance and the code for the first job in the 
third instance. 
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Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001). Previous research shows that age-
dependent financial incentives in public pension systems are important for 
retirement behaviour (e.g. Börsch-Supan, Brugiavini, and Croda 2009; Gruber 
and Wise 1999, 2004; Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder 2012). It is also unlikely 
that reaching the state pension age would induce some people not to retire, 
which would violate the monotonicity requirement. And since we hold constant 
individual-fixed effects and control very flexible for the continuous variable from 
which the binary instrument is constructed – in ways similar to RDD strategies – 
we believe the instrument satisfies the validity requirement in our set-up.18 
     Furthermore, having access to panel data also means that it is possible to 
investigate more thoroughly whether our set-up produces random variation in 
retirement. Indeed, if this is the case, the retirement coefficient should not differ 
much when including lagged mental health as independent variable, although 
precision may increase (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Including lagged mental health 
also makes it possible to test and control for potential mean reversion, which 
may affect the findings (e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009).19 
      Finally, we note that the age window utilised to determine the control group 
may impact the findings. Choosing the window involves a trade-off between 
consistency and efficiency: a smaller window decreases the likelihood of bias, 
but fewer observations simultaneously increase the variance (Lee and Lemieux 
2010). We thus restrict the age window in robustness tests to ensure that the 
results do not hinge on the one utilised in the main set-up. 
 
6 Results 
 
Table 3 displays OLS estimates that include individual-fixed effects, using the 
ten-year age window calculated at the second wave, but do not correct for 
endogeneity in retirement behaviour. The coefficients are insignificant for both 
measures analysed. This holds true when analysing the short-term association 
between the first and the second waves in the first panel, and when analysing the 
                                                        
18 As always, the estimates capture a local average treatment effect (LATE) of retirement on 
mental health (Imbens and Angrist 1994). In this study, the LATE is relevant for individuals who 
retire because they reach the relevant state pension eligibility age. 
19 Because individual-fixed effects are included, lagged mental health is mechanically correlated 
with     (Nickell 1981), but this is not a problem for this study’s purposes, as long as it is 
orthogonal to the instrument – which the exercise is supposed to test. 
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longer-term association between the second and fourth waves in the second 
panel. Meanwhile, the results in Table A2 show a negative direct association 
between the second and fourth waves, indicating a positive relationship between 
retirement and mental health over that period. The OLS estimates thus support 
previous findings of zero or positive effects of retirement on mental health. 
Table 3: Estimates from individual-fixed effects OLS models 
  FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Short-term associations 
    -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Long-term associations 
      -0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 n 8,566 8,566 7,113 8,566 8,566 7,113 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. All regressions include individual-, year-, and month-fixed 
effects, a quadric age trend, and interactions with country dummies. 
     Turning to our main research strategy to deal with endogeneity, Table 4 
displays the estimates from the FE-IV model in equations (2) and (3). The first 
stage results show that the instrument is strong, with the F statistics always 
displaying values considerably higher than 23.1, which is the relevant threshold 
when using cluster-robust standard errors (Olea and Pflueger 2013). The 
coefficients indicate that reaching the state pension age threshold increases the 
likelihood of retirement by 10-17 percentage points, depending on the definition 
of retirement, and are always statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. It is 
thus clear that there is sufficient variation in retirement behaviour in the data, 
and that it can be predicted well by the state pension age threshold. 
     The second-stage results in the first panel, in turn, display no evidence that a 
change in retirement status over the first and second waves, measured by the 
coefficient of    , has any short-term effects on changes in mental health over the 
same period. As displayed in Tables A3 and A5, this also holds true in the FE-IV 
analyses of the short-term impact over the second and fourth waves, in sharp 
contrast to the OLS estimates in Table A2. 
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Table 4: Estimates from FE-IV models  
  FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Short-term effects 
    -0.16 -0.26 -0.44 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 
Second stage (0.49) (0.78) (0.65) (0.11) (0.18) (0.15) 
      0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 88.56 38.32 48.62 88.56 38.32 48.62 
Hausman test  0.81  0.77 0.56 0.72 0.77 0.50 
Longer-term effects 
Excluding lagged mental health 
      1.70*** 2.74*** 1.90** 0.31** 0.50** 0.42** 
Second stage (0.55) (0.95) (0.74) (0.12) (0.21) (0.17) 
        0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 88.46 38.25 48.73 88.46 38.25 48.73 
Hausman test <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Including lagged mental health 
      1.61*** 2.60*** 1.69** 0.29*** 0.47** 0.37** 
Second stage (0.50) (0.87) (0.67) (0.11) (0.18) (0.15) 
        0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 88.42 38.23 48.67 88.46 38.24 48.75 
Hausman test <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
n 8,566 8,566 7,113 8,566 8,566 7,113 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. All models include the variables in equations (2) and (3). 
 
     Second, however, the results in the second panel uniformly indicate that a 
change in retirement status over the first and second waves, measured by the 
coefficient of      , has a large negative longer-term impact on changes in mental 
health between the second and the fourth waves. The coefficients in the second 
panel display that retirement increases the overall Euro-D score by 1.55–2.44 
points, relative to the control group, depending on which retirement definition 
that is utilised. Based on the descriptive statistics for the fourth wave in Table 2, 
this corresponds to 0.81–1.30 standard deviations. Meanwhile, retirement 
increases the likelihood of remaining or becoming clinically depressed, defined 
as scoring 4 or higher on the Euro-D scale, in the longer term by 31-50 
percentage points, relative to the control group. This corresponds to an impact of 
0.72–1.16 standard deviations, which is slightly lower compared with the effect 
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obtained for the Euro-D index. 20 Thus, the initial results indicate that retirement 
has considerable negative longer-term effects on mental health.21 
     Since we do not detect any short-term effects on mental health, the results 
indicate that the longer-term coefficients pick up a negative effect of retirement 
on mental health rather than merely a reversion following positive short-term 
effects. This interpretation receives support from models including lagged 
mental health in the third panel, which display almost identical, but slightly more 
precise, longer-term estimates. Also, as Table A4 shows, the results are very 
similar when analysing the impact of a change in retirement status between the 
first and second waves on the change in mental health between the first and 
fourth waves, thus incorporating any short-term effects directly. Overall, 
therefore, the FE-IV estimates point in one direction: retirement has no impact 
on mental health in the short run, but a large negative effect in the longer term.22 
     Meanwhile, in models evaluating longer-term effects, the Hausman tests 
always reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, indicating that OLS 
estimates are biased downward. This is unsurprising given the results in Table 3, 
but may be unexpected since potential reverse causality is often thought to bias 
OLS estimates in the opposite direction, with poor mental health raising the 
probability of retirement. Yet the differences are plausible since omitted 
variables and measurement error may bias estimates downward more than 
potential reverse causality biases estimates upward.23 
                                                        
20 The results are plausible since, as displayed in Table 2, the average Euro-D score increased 
from 1.91 to 2.25 (sd = 2.05), while the share of depressed individuals increased from 0.19 to 
0.25  (sd = 0.46), between waves 2 and 4 among respondents who crossed the state pension age 
between waves 1 and 2. This should be compared with an increase in the average Euro-D score 
from 2.11 to 2.27 (sd = 2.17), and the share of depressed individuals from 0.21 to 0.24 (sd = 
0.48), between waves 2 and 4 in the group who did not cross the state pension age in that period. 
The impact of retirement on mental health is effectively identified from these differences. 
21 The reduced-form effect of crossing the state pension threshold is to generate an increase of 
0.287 Euro-D points (standard error = 0.088) and raise the likelihood of depression by 0.053 
(standard error = 0.019), using the specifications equivalent to columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 in panel 2. 
In the sample analysed in columns 3 and 6 in panel 2, the reduced-form impact is 0.253 Euro-D 
points (standard error = 0.092) and 0.056 (standard error = 0.021) respectively. 
22 As Table A5 shows, the findings are very similar when analysing the lagged impact of 
retirement and controlling for the direct effect between waves 2 and 4, both in the main sample 
and when excluding respondents who were retired and above the state pension age in wave 1. 
The latter means the control group is restricted to (1) non-retired respondents and (2) non-
retired respondents under the state pension age. Overall, these results indicate that our main 
control group is appropriate for capturing the longer-term effects of retirement on mental health. 
23 Indeed, research analysing the impact of retirement on cognitive ability also finds that OLS 
results are biased in the same way (Bonsang, Adam, and Perelman 2012). 
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6.1 Robustness tests 
6.1.1 Three-year age window 
 
How sensitive are the results to the specific age window around the threshold? 
Table 5 displays estimates from models with the sample restricted to individuals 
aged within approximately three years over and under the lowest and highest 
thresholds at the second interview. We then instead include a linear age trend. 
Again, there is little evidence of any short-term effects. However, the longer-term 
effects are considerable, despite the fact that 45 per cent of the main sample is 
dropped. Estimates in Table A6 also show that the long-term effect remains 
when including a quadratic age trend, despite the narrower age window. Overall, 
therefore, the results are robust to using a narrower age window, which further 
supports the idea that our research design captures causal effects. 
Table 5: Estimates from FE-IV models (3-year age window) 
  FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Short-term effects 
    -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Second stage (0.40) (0.60) (0.49) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
      0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 123.34 60.33 78.85 123.34 60.33 78.85 
Hausman test  0.98  0.99 0.82 0.98 0.91 0.89 
Longer-term effects 
Excluding lagged mental health 
      1.30*** 1.98*** 1.18** 0.25** 0.39** 0.27** 
Second stage (0.44) (0.69) (0.53) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) 
        0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 123.66 60.64 79.27 123.66 60.64 79.27 
Hausman test <0.01 <0.01 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 
Including lagged mental health 
      1.28*** 1.95*** 1.08** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.27** 
Second stage (0.40) (0.63) (0.49) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
        0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 
First stage (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
F statistic 123.63 60.62 48.67 123.67 60.64 79.28 
Hausman test <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
n 4,704 4,704 3,818 4,704 4,704 3,818 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level in parentheses. 
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6.1.2 Inverse probability weighting 
 
As noted in Section 4.5, it is important to investigate whether panel attrition 
threatens the external validity of the findings. Table A7 displays results from the 
same specifications as those estimated in the third panels in Tables 4 and 5, with 
the exception that respondents are weighted by their inverse probability to 
remain in the panel, as predicted by the baseline characteristics discussed in 
Section 4.5. All estimates are very similar to the ones obtained without weights, 
irrespective of retirement definition utilised and outcome analysed. In fact, the 
coefficients become larger and more precise, even though a few observations are 
lost because of missing values on the variables used to predict the probability 
that respondents remain in the panel. The conclusion from this exercise is thus 
that it is unlikely that selective attrition poses a threat to the study’s findings. 
 
6.2 Heterogeneous effects 
 
While all results so far indicate that retirement has a negative average impact on 
mental health in the longer-term perspective, this does not necessarily mean that 
the effect is the same among different groups of people. Table A8 shows results 
from models that allow the long-term impact of retirement to differ depending 
on gender, educational background, and physical as well as psychosocial 
occupational strain, as discussed in Section 5.1. There is no evidence of 
statistically significant heterogeneous effects.24 The coefficients are generally 
small and/or not consistent across retirement definitions. In unreported 
regressions, we found no evidence of heterogeneous short-term effects between 
the first and second waves either. Overall, this indicates that the zero immediate 
and negative longer-term effects of retirement on mental health generally apply 
similarly to men and women as well as individuals of different socio-economic 
and occupational backgrounds.25 
                                                        
24 This also applies when analysing the sample within the three-year age window. We found 
some evidence that the negative impact of retirement was only detectable among respondents 
who were living with a partner at the time of the first wave. However, the number of single 
individuals being affected by the instrument threshold is small in our sample, which makes it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions from this exercise. 
25 In unreported regressions, we also estimated separate models for the different groups, but 
again found little consistent evidence of heterogeneity; no differences were statistically 
significant and no subgroups appeared to benefit from retirement. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
As policymakers worldwide have begun to reform state pension systems to 
induce higher labour force participation among the elderly, research 
investigating the causal impact of retirement on health and wellbeing has 
become increasingly important. While previous studies analysing mental health 
have generally found positive or no effects, it suffers from limitations. Perhaps 
most conspicuous is that nobody thus far has separated short- from longer-term 
effects of retirement in a rigorous framework that exploits discontinuities in 
retirement arising from state pension ages. This is an important shortcoming 
since there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the short- and longer-
term effects of retirement differ. 
     This study has sought to remedy these issues by investigating the short- and 
longer-term effects of retirement on mental health in ten European countries. 
Analysing panel data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in 
Europe, it has utilised an individual-fixed effects IV approach and age-based 
discontinuities within state pension systems as instruments. Although the results 
show no impact in the short run, there is strong evidence of a considerable 
negative lagged effect that appears within a couple of years’ time. This effect is 
apparent both when analysing the Euro-D scale as well as the cut-off point for 
clinical depression, and survives a range of robustness tests. It applies to women 
and men similarly and also appears to operate independently of individuals’ 
educational background and level of occupational strain. This indicates that 
people of different socio-economic backgrounds and professions are similarly 
hurt by retirement in terms of mental health. 
     Yet, although the study has found a negative longer-term impact of retirement 
on mental health, it is silent on the mechanisms through which this effect 
operates. Policymakers and practitioners would certainly benefit from 
understanding these mechanisms when attempting to counter the negative long-
run impact; identifying the specific mechanisms linking retirement to declining 
mental health in the long run remains an important topic for future research to 
investigate. 
     Nevertheless, overall, this study’s findings indicate that policymakers do not 
face a trade-off between making state pension systems solvent and improving 
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mental health among the elderly. Certainly, as displayed by other research, 
reforms affecting eligibility to state pensions may have immediate negative 
mental health effects operating independently of retirement, at least if these 
reforms affect people late in their lives. With time, however, this paper’s findings 
indicate that such reforms not only are necessary to make pension systems 
sustainable, but may also be an efficient way to improve mental health among 
the elderly by delaying the negative longer-term effect of retirement per se. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 27 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 25 
References 
 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: 
An Empiricist's Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2015. Mastering 'Metrics: The Path 
from Cause to Effect. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Atchley, Robert C. 1976. The Sociology of Retirement. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc. 
Behncke, Stefanie. 2012. “Does Retirement Trigger Ill Health?” Health Economics 
21:282-300. 
Bertoni, Marco, Giorgio Brunello, and Gianluca Mazzarella. 2016. “Does 
Postponing Minimum Retirement Age Improve Healthy Behaviours Before 
Retirement? Evidence from Middle-Aged Italian Workers.” IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 9834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
Blake, Hélène and Clémentine Garrouste. 2012. “Collateral Effects of a Pension 
Reform in France.” Working Paper No. 2012-25, Paris School of Economics, 
Paris. 
Bonsang, Eric, Stéphane Adam, and Sergio Perelman. 2012. “Does retirement 
affect cognitive functioning?” Journal of Health Economics 31(3):490-501. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel, Martina Brandt, Christian Hunkler, Thorsten Kneip, Julie 
Korbmacher, Frederic Malter, Barbara Schaan, and Stephanie Stuck. 2013. 
“Data Resource Profile: The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE).” International Journal of Epidemiology 42(4):992-1001. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel, Agar Brugiavini, and Enrica Croda. 2009. “The Role of 
Institutions and Health in European Patterns of Work and Retirement.” 
Journal of European Social Policy 19(4):341-358. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel and Morten Schuth 2014. “Early Retirement, Mental Health 
and Social Networks.” Pp. 225-250 in Discoveries in the Economics of Aging. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel and Christina B. Wilke 2006. “The German Public Pension 
System: How It Will Become an NDC System Look-Alike.” Pp. 573-610 in 
Pension Reform: Issues and Prospects for Non-Financial Defined Contribution 
(NDC) Schemes, edited by Robert Holzmann and Edward Palmer. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Brickman, Philip and Donald Campbell 1971. “Hedonic Relativism and Planning 
the Good Society.” Pp. 287-302 in Adaptation-level Theory: A Symposium. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Charles, Kerwin K. 2004. “Is Retirement Depressing? Labor Force Inactivity and 
Psychological Well-Being in Later Life.” Research in Labor Economics 23:269-
299. 
Coe, Norma B. and Gema Zamarro. 2011. “Retirement Effects on Health in 
Europe.” Journal of Health Economics 30(1):77-86. 
Dave, Dhaval, Inas Rashad, and Jasmina Spasojevic. 2006. “The Effects of 
Retirement on Physical and Mental Health Outcomes.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 12123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Page 28 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 26 
Dave, Dhaval, Inas Rashad, and Jasmina Spasojevic. 2008. “The Effects of 
Retirement on Physical and Mental Health Outcomes.” Southern Economic 
Journal 75(2):497-523. 
de Grip, Andries, Maarten Lindeboom, and Raymond Montizaan. 2012. 
“Shattered Dreams: The Effects of Changing the Pension System Late in the 
Game.” Economic Journal 122(559):1-25. 
De Luca, Giuseppe. 2009. “Determinants of the Attrition Process in the First Two 
Waves of SHARE.” Unpublished Paper, The Royal Society, London. 
d'Hombres, Beatrice, Lorenzon Rocco, Marc Suhrcke, and Martin McKee. 2010. 
“Does Social Capital Determine Health? Evidence from Eight Transition 
Countries.” Health Economics 19(1):56-74. 
Eduardo, Fé. and Bruce Hollingsworth. 2012. “Estimating the Effect of 
Retirement on Mental Health via Panel Discontinuity Designs.” Working 
Paper, Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
Eibich, Peter. 2015. “Understanding the Effect of Retirement on Health: 
Mechanisms and Heterogeneity.” Journal of Health Economics 43:1-12. 
Finnie, Ross and Bryon G. Spencer. 2013. “How do the Level and Composition of 
Income Change after Retirement? Evidence from the LAD.” Working Paper No. 
114, Canadian Labour Market and Skills Researcher Network, Vancouver. 
Fletcher, Jason M. 2014. “Late Life Transitions and Social Networks: The Case of 
Retirement.” Economics Letters 125:459-462. 
Folland, Sherman. 2008. “An Economic Model of Social Capital and Health.” 
Health Economics, Policy and Law 3:333-348. 
Fonseca, Raquel, Arie Kapteyn, Jinkook Lee, Gema Zamarro, and Kevin Feeney. 
2014. “A Longitudinal Study of Well-Being of Older Europeans: Does 
Retirement Matter?” Journal of Population Ageing 7:21-41. 
Gelman, Andrew and Guido Imbens. 2014. “Why High-order Polynomials Should 
not be Used in Regression Discontinuity Designs.” NBER Working Paper No. 
20405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Godard, Mathilde. 2016. “Gaining Weight Through Retirement? Results from the 
SHARE Survey.” Journal of Health Economics 45:27-46. 
Grossman, Michael 2000. “The Human Capital Model.” Pp. 347-408 in Handbook 
of Health Economics, edited by Joseph P Newhouse and Anthony J Culyer. New 
York: Elsevier. 
Gruber, Jonathan and David A. Wise, eds. 1999. Social Security and Retirement 
around the World. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Gruber, Jonathan and David A. Wise, eds. 2004. Social Security Programs and 
Retirement around the World: Micro-Estimation. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd, and Wilbert Van der Klaauw. 2001. “Identification and 
Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design.” 
Econometrica 69(1):201-209. 
Haider, Steven J. and Melvin Stephens. 2007. “Is There a Retirement-
Consumption Puzzle? Evidence Using Subjective Retirement Expectations.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 89(2):247-264. 
Page 29 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 27 
Hurd, Michael, Pierre-Carl Michaud, and Susann Rohwedder. 2012. “The 
Displacement Effect of Public Pensions on the Accumulation of Financial 
Assets.” Fiscal Studies 33(1):107-128. 
Imbens, Guido W. and Joshua D. Angrist. 1994. “Identification and Estimation of 
Local Average Treatment Effects.” Econometrica 62(2):467-475. 
Imbens, Guido W. and Jeffrey W. Wooldridge. 2009. “Recent Developments in the 
Econometrics of Program Evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature 47:5-86. 
Johnston, David W. and Wang-Sheng Lee. 2009. “Retiring to the Good Life? The 
Short-Term Effects of Retirement on Health.” Economics Letters 103(1):8-11. 
Jokela, M, JE Ferrie, D Gimeno, T Chandola, MJ Shipley, J Head, J Vahtera, H 
Westerlund, MG Marmot, and M Kivimäki. 2010. “From Midlife to Early Old 
Age: Health Trajectories Associated with Retirement.” Epidemiology 
21(3):284-290. 
Kroll, Lars E. 2011. “Job Exposure Matrices (JEM) for ISCO and KldB (Version 
1.0).” Dataset, GESIS Data Archive. http://doi.org/10.7802/1097. 
Latif, Ehsan. 2013. “The Impact of Retirement on Mental Health in Canada.” 
Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics 16(1):36-46. 
Lee, David S. and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in 
Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 48:281-355. 
Lemieux, Thomas and Kevin Milligan. 2008. “Incentive effects of social 
assistance: A regression discontinuity approach.” Journal of Econometrics 
142(2):807-828. 
Lindeboom, Maarten, France Portrait, and Gerard J. van den Berg. 2002. “An 
Econometric Analysis of the Mental-Health Effects of Major Events in the Life 
of Older Individuals.” Health Economics 11:505-520. 
Litwin, Howard. 2007. “Does Early Retirement Lead to Longer Life?” Ageing & 
Society 27:739-754. 
Mazzonna, Fabrizio and Franco Peracchi. 2012. “Ageing, Cognitive Abilities and 
Retirement.” European Economic Review 56(4):691-710. 
Mazzonna, Fabrizio and Franco Peracchi. 2014. “Unhealthy Retirement?” EIEF 
Working Paper 09/14, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, Rome. 
Mein, G, P Martikainen, H Hemingway, S Stansfeld, and M Marmot. 2003. “Is 
Retirement Good or Bad for Mental and Physical Health Functioning? 
Whitehall II Longitudinal Study of Civil Servants.” Journal of Epidemiology & 
Community Health 57:46-49. 
Moffit, Robert, John Fitzgerald, and Peter Gottschalk. 1999. “Sample Attrition in 
Panel Data: The Role of Selection on Observables.” Annales d'Économie et de 
Statistique 55-56:129-152. 
Montizaan, Raymond, Frank Cörvers, and Andries de Grip. 2010. “The Effects of 
Pension Rights and Retirement Age on Training Participation: Evidence From 
a Natural Experiment.” Labour Economics 17(1):240-247. 
Moreau, Nicolas and Elena Stancanelli. 2013. “Household Consumption at 
Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study on French Data.” IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 7709, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
Mosca, Irene and Alan Barrett. 2014. “The Impact of Voluntary and Involuntary 
Retirement on Mental Health: Evidence from Older Irish Adults.” Discussion 
Paper No. 8723, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
Page 30 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 28 
Neuman, Kevin. 2008. “Quit Your Job and Get Healthier? The Effect of Retirement 
on Health.” Journal of Labor Research 29:177-201. 
Nickell, Stephen J. 1981. “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects.” 
Econometrica 49(6):1417-1426. 
Oksanen, Tuula, Jussi Vahtera, Hugo Westerlund, Jaana Pentti, Noora Sjösten, 
Marianna Virtanen, Ichiro Kawachi, and Mika Kivimäki. 2011. “Is Retirement 
Beneficial for Mental Health? Antidepressant Use Before and After 
Retirement.” Epidemiology 22(4):553-559. 
Olea, José L. M. and Carolin E. Pflueger. 2013. “A Robust Test for Weak 
Instruments.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 31(3):358-369. 
Petterson-Lidbom, Per. 2012. “Does the size of the legislature affect the size of 
government? Evidence from two natural experiments.” Journal of Public 
Economics 96(3-4):269-278. 
Prince, M J., F Reischies, A T. Beekman, R Fuhrer, C Jonker, S L. Kivela, B A. 
Lawlor, A Lobo, H Magnusson, M Fichter, H van Oyen, M Roelands, I Skoog, C 
Turrina, and J R. Copeland. 1999. “Development of the EURO-D Scale - A 
European Union Initiative to Compare Symptoms of Depression in 14 
European Centres.” British Journal of Psychiatry 174(4):339-345. 
Rocco, Lorenzo, Elena Fumagalli, and Marc Suhrcke. 2014. “From Social Capital to 
Health - and Back.” Health Economics 23(5):586-605. 
Rohwedder, Susann and Robert J. Willis. 2010. “Mental Retirement.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 24(1):119-138. 
Ronconi, Lucas, Timothy T. Brown, and Richard M. Scheffler. 2012. “Social Capital 
and Self-Rated Health in Argentina.” Health Economics 21(2):201-208. 
SSA. 2006. “Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2006.” SSA 
Publication No. 13-11801, Social Security Administration, Washington, DC. 
Stancanelli, Elena. 2014. “Divorcing Upon Retirement: A Regression 
Discontinuity Study.” Discussion Paper No. 8117, Institute for the Study of 
Labor, Bonn. 
Stancanelli, Elena and Arthur Van Soest. 2012. “Joint Leisure Before and After 
Retirement: A Double Regression Discontinuity Approach.” IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 6698, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
Westerlund, Hugo, Mika Kivimäki, Archana Singh-Manoux, Maria Melchoir, Jane 
E. Ferrie, Jaana Pentti, Markus Jokela, Constanze Leineweber, Marcel 
Goldberg, Marie Zins, and Jussi Vahtera. 2009. “Self-Rated Health Before and 
After Retirement in France (GAZEL): A Cohort Study.” The Lancet 374:1889-
1896. 
Vo, Kha, Peta M. Forder, Meredith Tavener, Bryan Rodgers, Emily Banks, Adrian 
Bauman, and Julie E. Byles. 2015. “Retirement, Age, Gender and Mental Health: 
Findings from the 45 and Up Study.” Aging & Mental Health 19(7):647-657. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 31 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 29 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: State pension ages across countries, gender, and cohorts 
Country Men Women 
Austria 65 60 
Belgium 65 60-63 
Denmark 65-67 65-67 
France 60 60 
Germany 65 60-62 
Italy 60-65 55-60 
Netherlands 65 65 
Spain 65 65 
Sweden 65 65 
Switzerland 65 62-63 
Note: The state pension ages are based on those provided by Mazzonna 
and Perrachi (2012), with slight adjustments based on data from other 
sources (see Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2006; SSA 2006). The state pension 
age varies by country, gender, and cohort (as indicated by the age ranges 
in the columns). 
 
 
Table A2: The short-term association between retirement and mental health (waves 2-4) 
 FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS FE-OLS 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
    -0.13** -0.15** -0.17** -0.03** -0.03** -0.04** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
n 8,551 8,551  7,228 8,551 8,551   7,228 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. The model specifications correspond to those in the first 
panel in Table 3, but instead analysing changes between waves 2 and 4. The number of 
individuals differs slightly compared to the models in the paper. This is because of a few 
instances of missing data, and, in the case of the models using the third retirement definition, 
because more individuals reported themselves to be either working or retired between the 
second and fourth waves. 
 
 
Table A3: The short-term impact of retirement on mental health (waves 2-4) 
 FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
    -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.07  0.10 0.10 
 
(0.35) (0.50) (0.44) (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
F statistics 165.35 80.49 97.02 165.36 80.51 97.00 
Hausman   0.97  0.99 0.97  0.23 0.27  0.24 
n 8,551 8,551  7,228 8,551 8,551  7,228 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. The model specifications correspond to those in the first 
panel in Table 4, but instead analysing changes between waves 2 and 4, with all controls 
measured at  , while also including lagged mental health. 
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Table A4: Longer-term effects between waves 1 and 4 
  FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
      1.52*** 2.46*** 1.47** 0.27** 0.44** 0.33* 
  (0.56) (0.94) (0.75) (0.12) (0.20) (0.17) 
F statistic 88.46 38.25 48.73 88.46 38.25 48.73 
Hausman  <0.01 <0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
n 8,566 8,566 7,113 8,566 8,566 7,113 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level in parentheses.  The specification corresponds to the one used in the second 
panel in Table 4, but instead analysing changes in mental health between waves 1 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Controlling for short-term effects between waves 2 and 4 (excluding and 
including further restrictions on the control group) 
 FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Full working sample 
      1.91*** 2.67*** 1.62* 0.45***  0.67*** 0.51** 
 
(0.62) (1.03) (0.89) (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.21) 
    0.33 0.06 -0.02 0.18  0.17 0.12 
 
(0.56) (0.81) (0.73) (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.17) 
n 8,550 8,550  7,011 8,550 8,550   7,011 
Excluding individuals who were retired at wave 1 
      1.66*** 1.61** 1.20** 0.32***  0.34** 0.30** 
 
(0.52) (0.63) (0.59) (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
    0.26 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 
 
(0.44) (0.53) (0.48) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
n 4,757 3,535 3,334 4,757 3,535   3,334 
Excluding individuals who were retired and above the state pension age at wave 1 
      2.50*** 2.04** 1.64** 0.53***  0.40** 0.38** 
 
(0.94) (0.82) (0.77) (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.17) 
    -0.03 -0.05 -0.18 0.10 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.54) (0.70) (0.61) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) 
n 4,310 3,416 3,224 4,310 3,416   3,224 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. The specifications correspond to the one used in the third 
panel in Table 4, while also including     (with       as instrument). The minimum F statistic is 
18.45. The minimum Cragg-Donald F statistic is 14.29. The Hausman test always displays values 
lower/higher than 0.1 for the lagged/non-lagged coefficient 
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Table A6: Combining a quadratic age trend with the 3-year age window 
  FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Excluding lagged mental health 
      2.61*** 3.76*** 2.75** 0.50*** 0.72** 0.64*** 
 
(0.84) (1.33) (1.07) (0.18) (0.28) (0.24) 
F statistics 45.92 27.43 28.71 45.92 23.43 28.71 
Hausman <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Including lagged mental health 
      2.27*** 3.27*** 2.25** 0.39** 0.57** 0.48** 
 
(0.75) (1.18) (0.94) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) 
F statistics 45.82 23.33 28.50 46.01 23.37 28.76 
Hausman <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
n 4,704 4,704 3,818 4,704 4,704 3,818 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table A7: Estimates from models using inverse probability weighting 
  FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Weighted estimates from the 3rd panel in Table 4 
      2.21*** 3.48*** 2.67*** 0.39*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 
  (0.61) (1.05) (0.86) (0.11) (0.22) (0.09) 
F statistic 71.95 34.00 39.62 72.01 34.02 39.70 
Hausman  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
n 8,493 8,493 7,050 8,493 8,493 7,050 
Weighted estimates from the 3rd panel in Table 5 
      1.68*** 2.49*** 1.67*** 0.33*** 0.48*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.47) (0.72) (0.58) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) 
F statistic 106.12 58.20 69.37 106.10 58.23 69.41 
Hausman  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
n 4,661 4,661 3,782 4,661 4,661 3,782 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level are in parentheses. 
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Table A8: Heterogeneous effects 
 FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Retirement 
definition 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  Euro-D Euro-D Euro-D 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Clinical 
depression 
Gender 
             0.07 1.53 0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.05 
 (0.48) (0.98) (0.60) (0.10) (0.20) (0.14) 
      1.57*** 2.04*** 1.67** 0.33*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 
 (0.54) (0.71) (0.67) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
n 8,566 8,566 7,113 8,566 8,566 7,113 
Education 
                    -0.53 -0.28 -0.66 -0.10 -0.06 -0.14 
 (0.57) (0.81) (0.69) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) 
      2.02*** 2.86*** 2.22** 0.36** 0.51** 0.48** 
 (0.66) (1.02) (0.92) (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) 
n 8,502 8,502 7,056 8,502 8,502 7,056 
Occupational Physical Burden 
     *        0.04 0.14 0.24 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 
 (0.49) (0.69) (0.60) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
      1.55*** 2.33*** 1.76** 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.38** 
 (0.53) (0.84) (0.69) (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) 
Occupational Psychosocial Burden 
     *        0.21 0.17 0.57 0.07 0.08 0.13 
 (0.48) (0.68) (0.57) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
      1.43** 2.28** 1.47* 0.24* 0.39* 0.27 
 (0.60) (1.00) (0.80) (0.14) (0.22) (0.18) 
n 7,607 7,607 6,665 7,607 7,607 6,665 
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the individual level 
are in parentheses. The minimum F statistic for the instrumented interaction is 61.70 and the 
minimum F statistics for       is 18.70. The minimum Cragg-Donald F statistic is 23.77. The Hausman 
test always displays p-values lower than or equal to 0.1. All models include lagged mental health. OPB = 
Occupational Physical Burden. OSB = Occupational Psychosocial Burden. 
 
